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The Past 10 Years: National Averages
A drunk driver kills every 20 minutes.
More than 11 million families are related to someone seriously
injured or killed by a drunk driver.
Drinking drivers are responsible for more than 25,000 highway
deaths and 1.5 million injuries each year.
Everyday 14 teenagers die and another 360 are injured in
alcohol-related highway incidents. Drunk driving crashes
are the leadi~g cause of death among 16 to 24 year olds.
The cost of drunk driving collisions has amounted to more
than $24 billion a year in wages, productivity, purchasing





Kane County is the fifth largest county in the state
of Illinois. It is located 38 miles west of Chicago, Illinois,
in the Fox River Valley. The population, as of 1985, is
nearly 300,000 persons. The county seat is situated along
the Fox River, in Geneva, Illinois. It is a county with
a drunk driving problem to solve. Between 1980 and 1984
there have been over 200 highway fatalities that were alochol
related. (Kane County Criminal Justice Commission, 1985).
On September 14, 1982, the Kane County Board indicated
its deep concern for county residents by passing Resolution
82-122. The resolution commissioned the Kane County Task
Force on OrinkiMg and Driving, to reduce the extensive death
and injury due to driving under the influence (OUI).
.
The concept of establishing a county-level task force
on drinking and driving first evolved out of the efforts
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of the Kane County Criminal Justice Commission, which
coordinated two seminars to examine the problem and possible
solutions. The seminars put forth a major recommendation:
.
A task force must be created to find appropriate solutions
to the problems posed by drunk drivers. Thus, pursuant
to the Resolution 82-122, the Task Force members --
approximately 25 members from all segments of the county,
representing elected officials, law enforcemen~ judiciary,
treatment agencies, concerned citizens and educators --
were appointed.
The call of the Task Force was to take a "total systems
approach to the problem and develop any and all possible
solutions that will lead to a reduction of death and injury
.
caused by drunk drivers." In addition to the task of making
recommendations to combat the local drinking and driving
problem, the Task Force wa~ designated a pilot project for
the state of Illinois. The Task Force, therefore has served
as a model for the institution and implementation of task
forces throughout the state, serving both as a blueprint to
create similar task forces and to provide ideas on how to
improve local systems dealing with the OUI offender.
In 1985, the law enforcement and judiciary committee
of the Task Force recommended that a court watching program
be impleme~ted in Kane County. The program was aimed
specifically at having community volunteers monitor OUI
cBses ss they progressed through the court system. Volunteers
.
would sit in traffic court daily, taking notes on each OUI
cBse. A total of twelve people participated in the program.
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.Volunteers were assigned to each of the Five diFFerent courts
in Kane County with some courts being watched more Frequently
than others. Volunteers collected data on over one thousand
DUI cases. The data included Factual inFormation (sex and
age of the deFendant, type of hearing, sentence, etc.) and
subjective comments about each case. This inFormation was
then presented to the Task Force For review. The program
ran From December of 1984 through May of 1985. Its basic
goal was to increase the DUI conviction rate by applying
pressure on judges through a citizen's presence in the
court room.
This program will be evaluated For two reasons. First,
there is currently intense pressure by some members of the
.
Kane County Task Force to start the program up again. Other
members of the Task Force are reluctant to invest the time
committment necessary to run the program unless they can be
assured that the program is having an impact on the judicial
process. Second, more generally, court watching programs
are a relatively recent phenomenon. The Cook County program,
the oldest in the nation, began in 1974. A review of the
literature indicates that there has not been any studies
done evaluating the impact of such prorams on judges. This
evaluation will make a modest eFFort to close that gap in
the literature.
Kane County is not alone it its eFForts to combat drunk
driving. Last year, in Illinois alone, there were over 800
.
traFFic Fatalities attributed to drunk driving. (Statistical
survey, 1985, Illinois Secre1:a y_D.F State). Review of
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reports From the Illinois Secretary of State and the U.S.
.
Department of Transportation show that these agencies are
taking wide measures to reduce the DUI problem. Many
of these programs are aimed at changing public attitudes and
the attitudes of judges and lawyers. In their 1985 report
to the Governor, the Illinois DUI Task Force recognized
that "citizen court monitoring of DUI cases has become a
useFul tool For evaluating the efFectiveness of recent
reforms."
In a study authored by the Department of Transportation
(DOT HS 802 515, 1980) judges were identiFied as a target
group For any local drunk driving program. The study indicated
that judges, by their disposition of drunk-driving cases,
.
have the authority to affirm irresponsible decisions about
alcoho~ and driving or to contribute signiFicantly to a
redirection of public behavIor toward responsible action.
The major concern is judge's reluctance to trea~runk driving
as a serious oFFense requiring rehabilitation of the oFFender,
or to impose a Fine or other punitive action. In order to
combat this problem, the study suggested recording outcomes
of drunk driving arrests over one month periods to show to
judges. To assess the impact of public programs on judges
the study recommends comparing the dispositions of drunk-
driving cases beFore and after public education campaigns.
For the purpose of evaluating Kane County's court
watching program, a comparison of OUI dispositions beFore
.
and after the program was run will serve as outcome indicators.





This study is designed to measure the extent to which
the goals of the Kane County Court Watching Program have
been met. The goals of the program were as follows:
1. To increase the actual conviction rate of drunk
drivers in Kane County resulting in loss of
license.
2. In those cases where a conviction does not
result in loss of license, to increase the
severity of the penalty, i.e. higher fines.
(A person can be convicted and only receive a
fine without losing his license.)
The development of the hypotheses used to determine if
these goals have been met will be explained under the appropriate
sections. However, all hypotheses were reviewed and standards
.
for significance determined by the following five experts
in the areas of law and drunk driving. .
1. William Diamond - Director of Kane County Criminal Justice
Commission. In charge of setting up and implementing the
court watching program.
2. William Richards
- Chairman of the Kane County Task Force
on Drinking and Driving. Attorney in Kane County for the
past twenty years, very active in promoting stricter DUI
laws.
3. Judge Melvin Peterson - Currently in charge of deciding all
DUI cases for Kane County. Member of the Task Force.
. 4. Shirley Benning - Director of AAIM, The Alliance Against
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Intoxicated Motorists, IL. Active in promoting state wide
. standards for the processing of OUI cases. She was also
very active in the court watching program.
s. Robert Morrow - Kane County State's Attorney and member
of the Task Force
HYPOTHESES Primary and Subordinate
In order to determine if the goals of the project have
been met, the following primary hypothesis will be tested:
The court watching program was successful in influencing
judges to issue more frequently convictions resulting
in loss of licenses, or in cases where such a conviction
was not given, to increase the severity of the penalty
.
in terms of a higher fine.
The various people I mentioned earlier, in charge of and
involved in the program, indicated that a minimum of a ten to
fifteen percent increase in the conviction rate of each
particular judge would be necessary in order for them to
consider the program successful in this area. In cases
where a conviction was not issued, these same people and
other members on the task force indicated that a minimum of
a $500.00 fine for first offenders and a $750.00 fine for
repeat Qffenders would have to be imposed by each judge for
the program to be viewed as successful.
In order to test this hypothesis, a comprehensive comparison
will be made between three judge's conviction rates and
. penalties for drunk drivers before the program took place and
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and during the last three of the six months the program was
. in effect. A comparison of the conviction rate before and
after the program is not possible because many of the judges
were transferred to another division shortly after the program
was completed. Three of the five judges who were watched
were selected for the comparison. In ranking the judges
from least watched to most watched, I will be examining the
records of judges one, three and five. The time period
selected for comparison of the judge's records will be the
last three of the six months the program was run - March,
April, May of 1984 compared to March, April and May of 1985.
Therefore, total convictions and penalties for the three month
period of 1984 will be tabulated and compared against the
.
same month's totals for 1985 to determine if the objectives
of increasing the conviction rates of each judge by ten to
to fifteen percent and establishing certain minimum fines were
met.
This hypothosis and the others will be applied to each
judge separately tofietermine the validity of the hypotheses and
and to notice any differences between the least-watched judge
and the most-watched judge. In addition, the hypotheses will
be applied to the judge's combined records to determine the
validity of the hypotheses overall.
Subordinate Hypotheses
In addition to the primary hypothesis of comparing the
.
judge's overall conviction rates and penalties, four other
subordinate hypotheses will also be tested. The outcomes
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of these tests will be used as the basis for determining
.
the validity of the primary hypothesis. Each of tRe people I
talked with indicated that if the conviction rates and penalties
increased by the standards they set in any of these following
categories, then they believed the program would be worth
running again.
Hypothesis #2
The court watchers were successful in influencing the
judges to treat repeat offenders more harshly.
Much of the government literature on drunk driving stresses
that community action programs should take steps to get the
repeat offender off the road (DOT HS 806 542, April 1984).
The Kane County Task Force made this one of their main goals,
.
and it was hoped that the court watching program would help
to emphasize the community concern over the repeat offender.
According to a statement of policy issued by the Kane County
State's Attorney Office, their office is more likely to seek
a conviction if the person is a repeat offender rather than
if it is their first offense. (See Statement of Policy on
Drunk Drivers, issued by Kane County State's Attorney,
effective 1984, unpublished).
To test for harshness, the same standards and measurements
of 10-15% increase in conviction rate and $500-750 minimum fine
will be used as were used to test the primary hypothesis.
Hypothesis #3
.




judges to treat offenders with a high blood alcohol
content (over .15) more severly.
Government statistics show that the hgiher a person's
SAC is, the more likely they will be involved in an accident.
In IL a minimum SAC of .10 is necessary for conviction.
Forty-
five percent of drivers killed in multi-car crashes had a SAC
of .15 or higher (OOT HS 820 200).
Therefore, persons with
this SAC tend to represent a higher danger to the public;
and program officials hoped that judges would take this into
account whendetermining sentences.
The standards and measurements of 10-15% increase in
conviction rate and $500-750 minimum fines will be used to
test this hypothesis.
Hypothesis #4
Judges will issue more convictions and higher fines
to male defendants than to female defendants.
An informal survey of cases done by the Kane County Task
Force indicates that the average person arrested in Kane
County for drunk driving is between the ages of twenty-one
and twenty-eight and male. (See October 1984 minutes of the
Task Force). Considering, then, the large number of defen-
dants who fall into this category, it is possible that a
judge might be more biased against males then females.
Therefore, a program designed to influence judges to be
more harsh in their sentences might only affect them with
respect to the particular category of sex.
Male and female sentences will be averaged and compared
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for both 1984 and 1985 to see if there is any strong correlation
.
between severity of sentence and sex.
Hypothesis #5
Judges will take into account a defendant's age when
determining the severity of the sentence.
Again, because the survey by the Task Force indicated that
the average person arrested in Kane County is male and between
the ages of twenty-one and twenty-eight, age might well be
important consideration for a judge in determining how harsh
the sentence should be.
In order to test this hypothesis defendants will be broken
down into three groups by age
- those below twenty, between
twenty and thirty and over thirty. The judge's records will
then be compared as explained in the primary hypothesis to
.
determine whether or not there is any significant difference
in how a judge treats a particular age group.
Analysis of Data
In the following data tables judge #1 was watched 78%
of the time, judge #2 was watched 85% of the time and judge #3
wes watched 100% of the time . A comparison was made between
393 cases watched by court watchers in March through May of 1985
to 298 cases in March through May of 1984 when the program
was not in operation.
Hypothesis #1
-The court watching program was successful in influencing
judges to issue more frequently convictions resulting in loss
of licenses, or in cases where such a conviction was not given,
.
to increase the severity of the penalty in terms of a higher fine.
10
TABLE 1
BREAKDOWN OF CONVICTIONS BY JUDGE
.
Number af %Change
Convictions %of Convictians from 1984-85
JUDGE #1
Total Cases Watched 77 16 20
March-May1985
+7
Total Cases 61 8 13
March-May1984
JUDGE #3
32 25Total Cases Watched 127
March-May1985
+10
Total Cases 80 12 15
March-May1984
JUDGE #5
189 48 25Total Cases Vatched
March-May1985
+11
Total Cases 157 22 14
March-May1984
.




by ten to fifteen percent was not met. The average change
in the conviction rate for all three judges between 1984 and
and 1985 was 9%. However, judges 3 and 5 did increase their
TABLE 2




The overall standard of increasing the conviction rate
conviction rate by 10% and 11% respectively. The changes in
conviction rates show a strong correlation between how
.
frequently a judge was watched and how high of an increase
11
there was in his conviction rate betw€en 1984 and 1985.
.
Judge #1, who was watched 78% of the time, increased his
conviction rate by 7%, while judge #5, who was watched
100% of the time increased his conviction rate by 11%. (Refer
to Table 1).
By looking at Table 2, we can see that the overall
minimum fine of $500.00 was not achieved. The average,
overall fine for all three judges was $470.00 in 1985 as
compared to $433.00 in 1984. Judge #1 met the standard
of a minimun $500.00 fine. His 1985 fine of $530.00 can
not be attributed to court watchers, however, since his fine
remained constant for both 1984 and 1985. Judges 3 and
5, while not meeting the $500.00 standard, do show a marked
increase in their fines. For Judge #3 we see an increase
. of 9% pver the fine he gave last year and for Judge #5
we see an increase of 25% over the fines he gave last year.
As with the conviction rate, we see a definite~ correlation
between how often ~judge was watched and how high of a
percentage he increased his fines by. Again, it is significant
to note that Judge #5 who always had a court watcher in his
court room had the highest percentage change from 1984 to
1985.
Hypothesis #2
The court watchers were successful in influencing the
judges to treat repeat offenders more harshly.
Table 3 indicates that the standard or increasing the
.






Number of Convictions %of Repeat
Repeat of Repeat Offenders %Change
Offenders Offenders Convicted from 1984-85
JUDGE#1
Total Cases










































Repeat Offenders in 1984
Average Fine for





and by each individual judge. The overall conviction rate
.
for all three judges was twenty percent, doubling the minimum
standard of ten percent. The increase in the convictions
for repeat offenders correlated directly with how~f~equently
the judge was watched. While the difference between Judges
1 and 3 is not that large -4%-, the difference between Judges
1 and 5 is quite significant, a full 17% increase higher.
It would be safe to say, then, that the court watchers had
a direct impact on how often judges convict repeat offenders,
as evidenced by the average of a twenty percent increase over
last years conviction rate.
Table 4 shows that the standard of a minimum $750 fine
for repeat offenders was not met. The average fine for all
three judges for repeat offenders in 1985 was $595.00. The
. average for last year was $520.00. Again, Judge #1 remained
constant in his fines from 1984 to 1985
- therefore we don't
see any influence of the court watching program. It is
interesting to note, though, that while his fines didn't
increase, his overall conviction rate did increase while-the
program was in operation. Judges 3 and 5, who also didn't
make the $750.00 minimun, did increase their fines by-twenty
and twenty four percent respectively. Again, there appears
to be a slight correlation between how frequently the judge
was watched .and how high his fines increased.
Hypothesis #3
The court watching program was successful in influencing
.
judges to treat offenders with a high blood alcohol
14
content (over . 15) more severely.
8
TABLE 5
BREAKDOWN OF CONVICTIONS AND FINES FOR
DEFENDANTS WITH A BAC OF .15 OR HIGHER
1st time offenders
with BAC of .15 % change from average % change from
or higher Convictions 1984-1985 fine 1984-1985
.Judge #1
March-May '85 21 5 or 23% $530
+9 0
March-May '84 27 4 or 14% $530
.Judge #'3
March-May '85 39 7 or 17% $530 +17
+2
March-May '84 19 3 or 15% $450
.Judge #5




8Ch-May '84 44 9 or 20% $450
Repeat offenders with a BAC of .15 or higher were
excluded so as not to provid~ rival theory for any changes in
the conviction rate or level of fines. We can see that
the standard of a ten percent increase in conviction rate
was not met by any of the judges. Unlike the comparison
of repeat offenders, there doesn't appear to be any correlation
between how often a judge was watched and any increase in the
conviction rate. As a matter of fact, just the opposite
occurred. The judge who was watched least had the highest
increase in convictions, 9%, while the judge who was watched
8
most, actually experienced a decrease in his conviction rate
of 1%.
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with a SAC of .15 or higher was $520 in 1985 as compared to
$476 in 1984. As always, Judge #1' s fine remained at a
constant $530. Again there appeared a correlation between
.
Looking at Table 5 shows us that all of the judges met
the minimum fine of $500. The average fine for a defendant
Judge #3 and Judge #5 in how frequently they were watched and
how high they raised their fines. Judge #3 raised his by
17% and Judge #5 raised his by 25%.
It is interesting to note that even though Judge #1
did not raise his fine, he did increase his conviction rate
by 9%. Judge #3 only raised his conviction rate by 2%, but
he increased his fine by 17%. Judge #5 actually decreased
his conviction rate by 1% but increased his fine by a large
25%. This would indicate for Judges #3 and #5 that they
. are willing to increase their fines to defendants who have
a SAC of .15 or higher, but they are not willing to issue
convictions more frequently.
Hypothesis #4
Judges will issue more convictions and higher fines
to male defendants than female defendants.
Table 6 shows that each judge increased his conviction
rate of males from 1984 to 1985 by over the minimum standard
of ten percent. The same table shows, however, that no
judge increased his conviction rate for females by more
than 8%. The discrepency between the conviction rate for
males and females is most noticable in Judge #1. His conviction




BY GENDERAND BY JUDGE
Number Number of % Cba.~
of Cases Convictions %Convicted from ~85
JUDGE #1
Males 1985 54 13 241984 49 5 10 +14
Fe-.J.es 1985 23 3 13
-121984 12 3 25
JUDGE#3
Males 1985 96 24 251984 62 8 12 +13
Feales 1985 31 8 25 +31984 18 4 22
JUDGE#5
Males 1985 15~ 39 261984 114 15 13 +13
. Feales 1985 38 9 24 +81984 43 7 16
TAB1E7
BREAKDOWNOF FINES
BY GENDER AND BY JUDGE
JUDGE #1


























for women decreased a full 20%. Judge #3 increased his
. conviction rate for women by 3%, while increasing the conviction
rate for men by"3%. Judge #5 increased his conviction rate
for women by 8%, while increasing the male conviction rate
by 13%. There is a detectable bias against males by the
judges. Also, there is no apparent correlation between
how frequently a judge was watched and any change in his
conviction rate for either males or females.
The patterns in Table 6, where convictions are broken
down by gender, conflict with the patterns in Table 7
where fines are broken down by gender.
Excluding Judge #1
whose fine remained constant, the average fine for males
increased by 13%, while the average fine for females increased
.
by 21%. We don't see the bias here against males that we
saw in 'Table 6. It is worthwhile to notice that Judge #5,
who only increased the convIction rate for women by 8%,
increased the amount of the fine for women by 34%. It would
appear, then, that he is willing to substanially increase
the fines for women but only marginally increase their
conviction rate.
Looking at Table 7, with the exception of Judge #1,
neither of the other two jUdges met the minimun standard
of a $500 fine for either males or females.
We can see,
though, a correlation between how frequently a judge was
watched and by how much he increased his conviction rate
for both men and women. Judge's 3 and five increased the
.
amount in fine for men by ten and sixteen percent respectively.
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They increased the amount in fine for women by seven and
.
thirty four percent respectively.
Overall, judges were harsher towards men in issuing
convictions. With fines, however, the average fine increased
by a greater percentage for women then men.
Hypothesis #5
Judges will take into account a defendant's age when
determining the severity of the sentence.
Table 8 indicates that judges showed two different
tendencies when relating age group to conviction rate. In
the age group of defendants younger than twenty, judges
decreased therir conviction rate between 1984 and 1985 by
14.6%. In the group between twenty and thirty, though, the
.
conviction rate increased, on the average, by 16%. The large
increase in the conviction rate for this age group might
indicate the judge's awareness of the high percentage of
this age group arrested for drunk driving. There was not a
clear pattern of conviction rates for the group over thirty.
Also, there was no distinct correlatior1 between how often
a Judge was watched and a change in the coviction rate for







The results of the statistical analysis indicate that
judges, on the average, only increased their conviction
rate by 9.3%
- this falls short of the ten to fifteen
percent standard set up. Similarly, the average fine was
$470.00
- $30.00 under the minimum $500 standard. When
convictions and fines are broken down by type of defendant,
though, we can see more clearly the impact of the court
watching program on judges.
For repeat offenders, the judges increased their
conviction rate, on the average, by 20%
- this well exceeds
the ten to fifteen percent standard.
In addition, there
was a direct correlation between how often a judge was watched and
by how much his conviction rate increased.
Judge #1 who
was watched 78% of the time increased his conviction rate
by 13%, while Judge #5 who was watched 100% of the time
increased his conviction rate by 30%.
The average fine for
a repeat offender was $595.00, significantly short of the
$750.00 standard. Judge #1's fines stayed constant for
both years and all types of defendants.
For judges 3 and
five, though, there was an average increase of 22% in the
amount of the fine.
Conviction rates for defendants with a BAC of .15 or
higher did not increase by the 10% standard.
The average
increase was only 3%. There were no correlations between
how frequently a jUdge was watched and any changes in his
conviction rate for this category. The average fine
for all three judges, thou9-h, me.t the $500.00 standard.
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.Judge #5 showed a higher percent increase in his Fines than
did Judge #3.
Judges showed a deFinite tendency to issue more convictions
to males rather than Females. The average conviction rate
.increased For males between 1984 and 1985 by 13%, exceeding
the 10% standard. From 1984 to 1985 there was relatively
no change in the conviction rate For Females (less than
1% in the negative). The average Fines For both male and
Female Fell below the $500.00 minimum standard. Here, though,
judges showed a higher average increase in Fines For women
than For men. Judge #5 showed the highest increase in Fines.
For the age group of deFendants younger than twenty,
judges decreased their conviction rate between 1984 and 1985
.
by 14.6%. In the group between twenty and thirty, though,
the conviction rate, on the average, increased by 16%.
Overall, then, the judge's conviction rates increased
over ten percent in three of the Four groups that were
particularly important to the Task Force: repeat oFFenders,
males, and persons twenty to thirty years old. To that
extent the court watching program was successFul.
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